Democrats on the House Committee on Homeland Security have demanded that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) turn over legal and technical details about Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Mobile Fortify smartphone app, escalating congressional scrutiny of the agency’s street-level use of facial recognition.
The demand comes on the heels of the revelation that a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer was filmed wearing Ray-Ban Meta smart glasses during a Los Angeles immigration enforcement action in June, raising the question of whether consumer AI eyewear is creeping into federal policing and DHS biometric ID pipelines.
In their three-page letter to DHS Secretary Kristi Noem, Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson and subcommittee ranking members Lou Correa and Shri Thanedar asked for the app’s legal basis, the databases it searches, inter-agency agreements, field-use procedures, testing and accuracy data, and privacy documentation. They gave Noem until September 16 to respond.
The letter tees up a clash over where border technologies end and domestic policing begins. According to internal ICE communications cited by the lawmakers, officers can use a government smartphone to capture a face or contactless fingerprints and query systems the government typically uses when people enter or exit the U.S.
The committee wants DHS to explain how a capability built for border processing is being repurposed for interior enforcement, and under what authority.
“Congress has long had concerns with the federal government’s use of facial recognition technology and has regularly conducted oversight of how DHS utilizes this technology,” the letter says. “The Mobile Fortify application has been deployed to the field while still in beta testing, which raises concerns about its accuracy. Moreover, CBP has tested Mobile Fortify in specific scenarios, which may differ from how ICE utilizes the application in the field.”
Documents referenced in the letter describe Mobile Fortify’s user manuals and deployment notes. They indicate the app can search biometric and other databases and return a subject’s name, date of birth, nationality, immigration “A-number,” and removal status.
The materials also outline linkages across government repositories, including those maintained by the State Department, CBP, the FBI, and state sources. A “super query” mode is described as spanning people, vehicles, addresses, and other identifiers—functionality that, taken together, resembles a mobile investigative workbench.
Mobile Fortify was built to integrate seamlessly with DHS biometric databases and system. Agents using ICE-issued mobile devices can now photograph a subject’s face or fingerprint, triggering a near-instant biometric match against data sources that include CBP’s Traveler Verification Service and DHS’s broader Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) database which contains biometric records on over 270 million individuals.
The lawmakers have asked Noem to identify all databases touched by the tool; provide memoranda of understanding between ICE and CBP or other entities; detail approval processes and what happens when app results conflict with government IDs; supply performance and accuracy statistics and field tests; and produce training and privacy artifacts, including any Privacy Threshold Analysis or Privacy Impact Assessment covering ICE’s use.
They also asked for the constitutional and statutory basis for deploying Mobile Fortify on U.S. citizens away from ports of entry.
One question asked by the lawmakers is whether DHS tested image capture “through laminated safety glass in outdoor conditions,” a scenario common in curbside stops and traffic encounters. Another asks how many potential matches a typical search return and how agents are trained to handle ambiguous or conflicting match results in the field, which are issues that go directly to risk of misidentification and wrongful detentions.
At the heart of the fight is the government’s long-running Traveler Verification Service which CBP describes as an entry/exit biometric matching system for air, sea, and land environments. TVS has been framed as a border facilitation tool with specific statutory anchors and privacy documentation.
Applying similar capabilities to street-level stops raises Fourth Amendment questions like what constitutes reasonable suspicion for biometric scans; whether a face scan can be used to develop probable cause; and how agencies validate a match before it triggers enforcement.
The lawmakers’ inquiry suggests that they are concerned not only with technical accuracy, but with legal predicates and due-process safeguards when technology designed for border chokepoints is adapted for general policing.
The letter also underscores the program’s maturity. A May 28 message to ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations staff states that Mobile Fortify is “in beta testing and available for use.” That phrasing signals a deployment that is operational rather than purely pilot-phase, even as accuracy testing and privacy documentation may still be in flux.
The committee asked Noem to clarify who authorized the rollout, which offices reviewed the tool, and whether any independent audits have been conducted.
For now, DHS has not publicly provided comprehensive details on Mobile Fortify’s governance or performance, which leaves key questions unanswered, such as which specific data holdings are queried by default? Are border-collected biometrics being reused in the interior under a theory of compatibility that Congress never explicitly endorsed? What human-in-the-loop checks exist before a patrol-side match drives an arrest or detention? And what recourse does a misidentified person have if a face scan yields a false positive?
The Democrats pressing the issue each bring distinct oversight levers. Thompson, the panel’s top Democrat and a former chair, coordinates caucus strategy on DHS technology oversight. Correa, as ranking member on the Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement, has direct jurisdiction over CBP and ICE operations.
Thanedar, as ranking member on the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Accountability, is positioned to drive follow-on document requests and hearings if DHS is unresponsive.
Even without subpoena power, the minority can force visibility through hearings, Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits, and publication of agency responses, all tools that have, in past technology disputes, surfaced critical records and compelled policy changes.
The broader policy context is shifting quickly. DHS continues to evolve its identity infrastructure while Congress debates privacy legislation and the bounds of AI-enabled enforcement.
Meanwhile, a growing body of research and casework has documented performance variability in facial recognition systems across demographics and capture conditions. And that’s why the lawmakers’ questions reach beyond narrow technical metrics to real-world use.
If accuracy drops outdoors, through glass, or with angled captures, how do officers mitigate risk; what match thresholds are set; and who signs off on those thresholds?
What happens next will hinge on Noem’s response. As a loyalist to President Donald Trump and his divisive immigration policies – many of which federal courts have ruled are either unconstitutional or in violation of constitutionally authorized statutory law – she has been inclined to not want to answer questions from Democrats in Congress despite her duty to do so.
If she provides a fulsome accounting, expect a granular review of whether ICE can lawfully use border-collected biometrics for interior enforcement, how false matches are mitigated, and whether privacy reviews contemplated Mobile Fortify’s expansion beyond ports of entry.
If the response is partial or delayed, watch for follow-up letters, public release of correspondence, and pointed questioning at upcoming hearings, alongside potential referrals to GAO to independently evaluate accuracy, governance, and data-sharing claims.
Article Topics
accuracy | biometric identification | biometric matching | biometrics | DHS | facial recognition | ICE | mobile app | mobile biometrics | Mobile Fortify | U.S. Government